Pace University

DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

1-1-1998

Private Bar Monitors Public Defense: Oversight Committee Sets
Standards for Indigent Defense Providers
Adele Bernhard
Pace Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Bernhard, Adele, "Private Bar Monitors Public Defense: Oversight Committee Sets Standards for Indigent
Defense Providers" (1998). Pace Law Faculty Publications. 410.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/410

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

Private Bar
Oversigh*

Monitors

coumnri*ee
Sets Standards

Pub 1i c Def ense
for fndigent

Defense

Plroviders

By Adele Bern hard

R

eacting to a strike by The Legal
Aid Society's criminal defense
staff in 1994, New York City
began a search for alternate defender
organizations to break what government
officials saw as a lnonopoly on the
delivery of indigent defense services.
Concerned that the city would solicit
with the narrow goal of cost containment rather than providing quality services, the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, First Department,
at the urging of local bar associations,
created an eight-member oversight
committee of lawyers to monitor the
effects of the decision to contract with
multiple providers. As more local and
state governments nationwide turn to
competitive contracts for criminal indigent defense services, the experiences
of New York City's private bar initiative may prove useful for other jurisdictions attempting to set standards and
goals to ensure quality services and

protect criminal defense services from
political and fiscal pressures.
The confrontation between The
Legal Aid Society (LAS) and the city
began when the Association of Legal
Aid Attorneys, the LAS lawyers' union,
voted to strike over low wages and a 15
percent increase in individual caseloads. In a city where close to 900 individuals are arrested and detained each
day, and where each of those persons
must be represented by counsel in order
to be arraigned, a strike by defense
providers can disrupt the courts and jam
arrest processing. The strike incensed
city government officials and the
mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, who threatened to terminate The Legal Aid
Society's long-standing contract with
the city and to withhold payments due.
He also demanded a $16 million dollar
retroactive cut in the LAS budget.
Finally, he told striking lawyers that
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practicing as criminal defense lawyers
for both LAS or the city's assigned
counsel plan.
The threats worked. The union
ended the strike and the lawyers quickly returned to court. The mayor, however, was not satisfied. He took action
to ensure that he would never again
depend so heavily upon a single unionized provider of criminal defense services. The next year, he dramatically
reduced the size of LAS's city contract,
forcing the layoff of dozens i f experienced lawyers and drastically reducing
training and supervision for the staff. ~t
the same time, he issued a request for
proposals (RFP)soliciting potential
providers of criminal defense services
in each borough.
- The RFP invited new
organizations to represent 12,500 indigent individuals in Manhattan and
10,000 in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and
Queens. In Staten Island the new
provider would completely replace
LAS. Two new appeals offices would
each represent 250 clients. For the
fust time LAS faced competition. The
organized bar, meanwhile, reacted
with alarm.
The local bar associations were
aware that New York City was not the
first jurisdiction to experiment with
defense services contracts, which are
becoming increasingly popular. The
most recent survey by the Bureau of
Justice Statistics reports that no contracts for defense services existed in
1972; however, by 1986, contracts were
in use in 6 percent of all counties
nationwide and 14 percent of all counties with a population of one million or
more. Ten years later it is likely that
those numbers have grown exponentially. But as contracts proliferate, they
have been criticized by courts, the academic community, and the American Bar
Association.
Fixed-price contracts are the most
worrisome. In a fixed-price contract, a
lawyer or group of lawyers agrees to
handle all assignments in a given jurisdiction over a set period of time for a
set price. Such a scheme is attractive to
states and local governments concerned
with containing costs and accurately
predicting expenditures, but fixed-price
contracts risk reducing quality of
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services, especially when
connacts are awarded
through competitive bidding.
Further, contract organizations risk jeopardizing their
professional independence as
allegiances gravitate towards
funding sources rather than
clients.
Recognizing the potential
for problems, the ABA
Standards for Criminal
Justdce: Providing Defense
Services warn that contracts
should not be awarded "primarily on the basis of cost"
and suggest that contracts for
services include terms and
conditions designed to ensure
quality representation and
professional independence.
Robert Spangenberg, an
expert consultant in criminal
justice and defense services,
opposes the use of the fixedprice contracts, preferring
agreements that bind the contractor to representing only a
fixed number of clients or
cases for a set price.
Although such an arrangement is no guarantee against
the risk that cases will turn
out to be complex, requiring
more lawyer and expert hours
than anticipated, it does
afford more protection than
an open-ended contract that
forces an organization to handle all
arrests and resulting prosecutions within
its jurisdiction. Unfortunately, many
contractors across the county have
agreed to fixed-price, open-ended contracts. In fact, as the bar associations
were later to discover, this is exactly the
predicament in which LAS now found
itself.
Concerned that the city would pick
the cheapest, most efficient defense
provider rather than the best-equipped
and most dedicated to delivering quality

services, the New York County
Lawyers' Association, joined by the
Association of the Bar of the City of
New York and the Bronx Bar
Association, first approached the city to
establish an oversight mechanism.
When the city declined, the associations
drafted rules for the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, to establish an oversight
committee responsible for shielding the
quality of defense services from costdriven politics. The rules enacted as
Part 603 of the Supreme Court,
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Appellate Division, First Department
Court Rules create an eight-member
Indigent Defense Organization
Oversight Committee with the
authority and responsibility to monitor
the provision of all defense services in
the First Department-the Bronx and
Manhattan -and to consider all matters pertaining to the performance and
professional conduct of such organizations and the individual attorneys in
their employ.
Recognizing that an honest evaluation of defense services would be controversial, difficult to accomplish, and
potentially open to misinterpretation by
political adversaries, the oversight committee began its supervisory task cautiously. Public defense systems,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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whether public defenders, contract
offices, or private bar plans, have been
virtually exempt from public scrutiny
despite the burgeoning numbers of
defense offices and the growing cadre
of private lawyers who provide defense
services at public expense. Criticism of
defense services has focused generally
on the performance of individual attorneys on individual cases. Even the
comprehensive McConville and Mirsky
report, Criminal Defense of the Poor in
New York City, 15 N.Y.U. Rev. L. &
Soc. Change 581 (1986-87), which
criticized the work of all the city's
defenders, failed to suggest how the
organizations might help staff improve
performance. Studies of public defense
systems concentrate on hnding, with
failures and shortcomings attributed to
Spring 1998

lack of financial support. Written by
defense consultants in order to generate
more funding or by death penalty abolitionists whose insights can be lost in
the fray over the sanction, conclusions
lack objectivity and have failed to capture the public's interest. Whether the
public does not believe the diagnosis or
is simply unconcerned about the quality
of services, no one pays a great deal of
attention to how well a public defense
organization works.
The courts, too, rarely comment.
Members of the bench seldom pasticipate in efforts to monitor attorney performance (apart from Rule 11 sanctions
in the federal system) and only overturn
convictions when the quality of representation sinks to the level of constitutional "ineffectiveness"-a standard

incentive.
The committee debated whether its
monitoring might help the defender organizations to improve funding and remind
fivnding sources of the importance of
investing in defense services. The committee also considered what a public
defender office could do to motivate a
young and idealist staff, such as training,
supervision, and evaluation, in addition
to better promotional opportunities and a
chance at recognition.

Standards and guidelines
With all these considerationsin mind, the
oversight committee drafted standardsand
guidelines with the primary goal of creating a
yardstick for defense services organizations
against which to measm performance and
the hope that a practical set of standards serve
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multiple purposes, including:
educating a skeptical public about what it
takes to provide quality defense services;
promoting an understanding of why adequate funding is necessary (to engender
public support for more spending);and
providing notice to the organizations
themselves of what is expected of a publicly funded defense office.
National and local bar associations have
drafted several standards relevant to the
task of providing criminal defense services.
Most assigned counsel plans, for example,
have qualification standards for screening
lawyers in criminal defense cases. Those

and what kind of supervision should be
available; and where the caseload limits
ought to be set for felonies, misdemeanors,
and appeals.
The committee's startingpoint was the
ABA Standad for Criminal Justice: PE)viding Defewe Senlices (third edition),
drafted by the Criminal ust tie standards
Committee of the Criminal Justice Section
and approved with commenw in 1992,
Also useful was the NLADA's Gui&lines
for Negotiating &Awarding Governmental Contractsfor Criminal Defense Services, adopted in 1984, as well as standacds
developed by state public defender commissions in Washington,Maqsachusetts,
and Indiana. Each set
was intended to assist
Without monitoring and
defense organizations in obtaining
consequences, standards have
funding, and every
little bite.
set contained useful
ideas. Overall, however, the existing
standard5 employed
standards concentmte on a lawyer's qualifi- broad, general language, ill-suited for the
cations and experience. The ABA and the
purposes of monitoring the defense system.
The ABA standards, for example, require
National Legal Aid and Defender Associa"reasonable compensation levels (Standard
tion (NLADA) have each adopted perfor5-3.2) . . . a policy for handling conflicts of
mance standards for prosecutors and deinterest cases (Standard 5-3.3(vii) . . .
fense attorneys that focus on an individual
lawyer's responsibilities when representing workload limits for individual lawyers (v) .
. .supervision,evaluation, training, and
an individual client. Those standards emprofessional development (xi) . . .a system
phasize what tasks (e.g., motion practice,
of case management and reporting (xiv). "
investigation, plea bargaining, or sentencnone provided answers to two major
ing advocacy) ought to be conducted on
questions: Who monitors the contract
any individual case. But the committee's
providers for compliance?And, what sancapproach was organiaational, not individtions are imposed if the providers are found
ual. The cornnittee was less interested in
not to be in compliance?
attorney qualifications than in how a defender office ensures that its lawyers are
qualified; less interested in defining effecCreating a yardstick
tive advocacy than in how a defender ofThe committee realized that its eight
fice enssures that its staff performed zealvolunteer members would be responsible
ously. The committee's goal was to
not just for defining how organizations
establish minimum protocols for hiring,
ought to assist lawyers, but also for on-site
training, supervising, supporting, and evalinspections to venfy whether the organizapracticalities of runuating 1awye-e
tions really provided the support they
ning an office. These types of standards
claimed. Detailed standards would be easiwere rare indeed.
er to use than vague pronouncements open
Based on existing standards and the exto multiple interpreutions.A standard simperience of committee members and other
ply requiring 'Wning" isn't much help
defenders, the committee determined what
when it comes time to inspect an organizathe lawyer/investigatorratio should be;
tion. The organization might claim that its
how much training and continuinglegal
one-week introductory course satisfies a
education should be provided; how much
''training requirement, while the inspec-

tion team might determine that "training"
requires on going continuing legal education. An organization might believe that
hiring a single investigator satisfies a standad that requires "sufficient investigatory
staff" while the review committee might
have quite a different idea. Thus, in drafting
the standards, specifics were included
where possible, without any particular organization in mind, to give the organizations clear notice of expectations and to reduce post monitoring debates.
The oversight committee's performance
standards, entitled General Requirements
for All Organized Providers o f Defense
Services to Indigent Defidmts, is divided
into 10 sections: professional independence; qualiticationsof lawyers; training;
supervision;workloads, evaluation, promotion, and discipline; support services;case
management and quality control; compliance with standards of professional responsibility; and reporting obligations. Each
section is divided into three paas: performance standard%,evaluation criteria, and a
commentary. [For details, see sidebar "Performance Standards."]
Failure to meet the specific guidelines
would not necessarily mandate a finding
that the organization is not providing quality representation, but the busden to explain
how it was accomplishing the goal would
be on the organization. "In such cases, the
defense organization must demonstratethat
it has adopted equivalent practices and procedures suitable to its particular structure
and method of operation to ensure adherence to each of the Performance Standards."
Before finalizing the standards, the
oversight committee solicitedcomments
from interested defender organizations, including those that would be evaluated on
the basis of compliance with the standards.
Most of the standardswere accepted without discussion. One area that generated
controversy was the workload/caseload
standard. The Legal Aid Society, in particular, thought that the committee's decision to
count cases at the point of intake-arraignments---would result in its lawyers' caseloads exceeding the standard. LAS argued
that cases should be counted post arraignment, pointing out that many matters are
disposed of at the first stage of a criminal
proceeding, and arguing that pending post
intake cases should be the only ones counted as a measure of workload. The commitCRIMINAL JUSTICE
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tre considered this argument, but being unsure whether nlore cases are disposed of at
intake Ncw York City than in other major
cities, mcrnbec; declin~vito adopt nu~nbem
that dBered from the nationally accepted
workload standards.

Monitoring
Compliance inspections and rebuttable
presumptions were also co~ltei~tious.
Robert
Spangenbesgwrote that "the monitoring of
tltese standards would ~zsultin a system of
ameditation or cestitication, which does not
exist in any indigent defense system in the
country." He warned that such a system has
serious prohlems because it doesn't take
"'into account available resources . . . ;the
rigidity of certification standards would not
leave room for innovative approaches that
public defenders are taking tc>wardsimproved representation; and . . . the monitoring of performance standardsrequires a
substantial staff of both attorneys and nonattorneys."
But without monitoring and the possibility of ramifications based on observable findings, the st'andards would have little bite.
There seemed little purpose in drafting another set of goals that could be breached
without regard for consequellces. The oversight committee wanted to establish a workable and practical list of minimum rquirements, which if not achieved would signify
that the organization could not be certified
as providing quality seprese~~tation.
The
comniittee decided that the difficulty of the
task was not an argument for refusing to
begin, and because the presumption was rebuttable, not conclusive, the general requirements would be flexible enough to permit
innovation.
Once the standards were pro~z~ulgated
on
July 1, 1996,the co~nmitteebegan its monitoring work. Although New York had not
yet cc)nh-dctcdwith any new organizations to
provide defense services in the First Depcutment, existing providers were within the
oversight committee's sphere of recpcnsibiljty. They included The Legal Aid Society
(which has sepmdte trial offces in the Bm11x
and Manhattan and an appellate unit), the
OEce ofthe Appellate Defender (a small
officeproviding repuesentation on crirnind
appeals), and the Neighborhood Defender
Service of Harlem (a trial office that was
started by the VERA Institute of Justice as a
demonstration project).
Spring 1998

Fist, the oversight committee asked
each oqpnization to submit written documentation of its compliance with the general requirements by responding to a questionnak requesting speciiic information.
Answers could be supplemented with any
relevant material. [See sidebar "Questionnaire on Qualifications."J
After receiving the organizations' submissions, inembers of the committee, acconlpanied hy additional volunteers from
the t h e participating bar associations, visited the three defense organization offices
and interviewed a number of the personnel
to verify the written information. In other
words, if an organization claimed to provide continuing legal education (CLE), the
inspection team looked to see what was ac-

tually provided. Teams asked the lawyers
not simply whether CLE was available, but
whether it was available at a time they
could attend and whether the offerings
werx useful to their practice. Thus, the inspections were both in-depth and extensive.
Committee mcmbers met, for example,
every member of the staff of the Office d
the Appellate Defender and 29 lawyers
with the Manhattan oftice of the LAS criminal defcnse division.
Teams met with clerks, data input specialists, social workers, investigators, administrators, supervisors, and staff kawyers
in an effort to question each about all the
areas covered by the standards. To a much
lesser extent, the committee interviewed
judges, criminal defense practitioners, aild
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others familiar with the activities of the
three organizations. After the interviews
were completed, each team distilled the results into a subcommittee r e m from
which, along with the organizations"tten submissions, the oversight committee
drafted a h t annual report.

Can quality survive in NYC?
The report found that "as of the fall of
1996,each of the three defense organizations provides quality repl-esentation generally meeting the Standards." It noted, however, that there we15 certain substantid
problems that, if not corrected, would compromise the quality of services provided in
New York City. The most troublesome
finding was that The Legal Aid Society's
cawload far exceeded the numbers designated in the committee's general requirements and specific guidelines, presumptively violating Performance Standard V,
which requires lawyers "to maintain manageable workloads in order to permit them
to render quality representation to each individual client." Because the committee
had questions about the propriety of applying the nationally accepted caseload numbers to New York City defense organizations, and its intent in this initial monitoring
was not to punish any organization but to
assist it to improve the quality of representation, the committee decided:
Legal Aid's contractual arrangements
with the City require it to represent all
indigent persons arrested (except conflictcases) for whom other arrangements are not available. Because the
City's current anticrime efforts include
making a rising number of arrests, Legal
Aid is required to handle an ever increasing number of cases with a reduced
budget and staff. As a result, both New
York and Bronx O D s ' workloads
greatly exceeded the Oversight Committee's Guidelines. lTf that situation
continues] the Committee is concerned
that the quality of Legal Aid's representation will necessarily continue to be
eroded.
In the absence of some conb-actual
m t y of acceptablecaseload limits
or fiscal provision for increasing caseloads, there does not appear to be any
assurance that Legal Aid can meet the
Oversight Committee's workload guide-

lines in the future. The current arrangement is likely to result in a reduction of
quality representation.
The committee found that LAS's failure
to establish and comply with caseload limi b was adversely affecting staff morale and
delivery of services. This problem, identified as early as 1971by the Appellate Division Committee, must now be resolved, In
an attempt to remain the primary defender
in New York City, LAS had agreed to rep
resent all indigent criminal clients (an expanding clientele) for a single, fixed price,
which put it in an untenable position. The
struggle to provide services in court with
fewer lawyers and a smaller budget is inevitably impinging upon training and supervision. Regarding supervision,the oversight committee found:

In addition to its caseload levels, at
Legal Aid's New York CDD, the ratio of
supervisorsto staff does not meet the
Oversight Committee's S@c Cuideline. As Legal Aid staff lawyers struggle
to cope with larger workloads, the adequacy of supervision becomes ever
more important. Legal Aid has tried to
compensate for the s h q reduction in
numbers of supervisorsat both the trial
and appellate levels by employing new
training methods, oversight and review
of staff lawyen' work product. Nevertheless, particularly at New York CDD,
there has been a noticeable diminution
of in-court supervision which, if allowed
to continue, will adversely affect quality.
Finally?the standards highlighted trends
cutting across the New York City criminal
justice system:
As the City's anti-crimeefforts pour
thousands of additional misdemeanor
cases into the system, Legal Aid risks
evolving into a misdemeanor defense
organization. The City's contracts with
alternate offices for portions of the defense work in the Second Department,
and its 1996RFPto handle cases not
being handled by Legal Aid in New
York and Bronx Counties, require that
the contractingorganizations hire only
lawyers qualified to handle felonies.
Thus, new lawyer training in criminal
defense work is likely to depend even
more in the future on the efforts of

Legal Aid, which will be employing dl
new, inexperienced lawyers, and p v i d ing misdemeanor representation and
training for the criminal defense bar. Accordingly for the long term future,it is
important that the training functions of
Legal Aid be maintained and enhanced.
Since the committee's initial report, New
York City has negotiated contracts with
three new defense organizations in the First
Department, bringing to seven the number
of new defense providers in the city. The
Bronx Defenders and the New York County
Defender Services began accepting trial
court assignments in September 1997.The
Center for Appellate Litigation is handling
appeals. As anticipated,the city reduced
Legal Aid Society's budget to fund these
new offices. It is still too early to anticipate
whether the young organizations will be
fundedat a level sufficient to meet the oversight committee's general requirements or
whether the cuts to LAS's budget will render
it incapable of reducing caseloads. The committee will begin its second round of monitoring-focusing on the new institutionsthis spring, issuing a report in late 1998.
Hopefully, the standardshave made the
public as well as those in city government
aware of the complexity of providing quality
services, stimulating service providers to
better support staff with training, supervision, and case management tools.
But what happens if the organized defense providers fail to meet the standards?
Because the oversight committeeis an accrediting body of the appellate division, it is
likely the appellate division would instruct
its trial judiciary to refrain from assigning
cases to employees of "de-cert%ed" organizations-in effect, preventing the new
organizations from handling any cases,
despite their contract with the city. Such a
face-off would certainly result in litigation.
Meanwhile, the work of the Indigent
Defense Organization Oversight Committee
proves that practical standardscan be draked,and that armed with standards, even a
small w d t t e e of volunteer lawyers can
evaluate criminal defense services. The next
step is to insist during funding negotiations
that are taking place in New York City and
across the country thatthe defender offices
are provided with the support and resources
they need to meet the standards, practice
competently, and represent their clients.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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